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"What the railroads wanted, in other words, was a government-
sponsored and enforced cartel in place of the many private
ones that kept failing."
INTRODUCTION
It has been called a "supreme evil,"2 one that impacts a volume of
commerce that reaches into the billions of dollars.3 Moreover, it results
in fines totaling hundreds of millions of dollars a year,4 and carries with
it a potential criminal sentence of up to ten years.' One might guess,
with good reason, that these statements describe conduct such as drug
trafficking or the sale of other illegal goods. In fact, however, they
describe the behavior of commercial entities participating in cartels,
motivated by a desire to maximize profits and minimize competition.
* J.D., The George Washington University Law School. B.A., International Relations,
Michigan State University.
** J.D., The John Marshall Law School. B.S., Mechanical Engineering, Michigan State
University. eric.d.gorman@gmail.com.
1. JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH: THE EPic HISTORY OF AMERICAN
ECONOMIC POWER 238 (2004). This quote demonstrates the mindset of private firms who desire to
enter into cartels immune to antitrust scrutiny through a judicially-created antitrust exemption
known as the state action doctrine.
2. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004).
3. Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Cartel Enforcement in the United States (And Beyond) 2 (Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://www.
justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/221868.pdf.
4. See id. ("In the fiscal year that ended September 30, 2006, the [Antitrust] Division [of the
Department of Justice] . .. obtained total fines of more than $473 million .
5. Id. at 3.
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Knowing that such behavior is normally met with swift and harsh conse-
quences if uncovered, one may be surprised, or more likely dismayed to
learn that cartels have sometimes found shelter in the United States
under what is known as the state action doctrine. 6 The state action doc-
trine shields these cartelized firms from antitrust scrutiny, which results
in untold amounts of consumer losses in the form of artificially elevated
consumer pnces.
Active competition is the backbone of United States economic pol-
icy, but it can be relentless, prompting firms to avoid competition if at
all possible. Normally, competitors will avoid forming a cartel because
the risks of getting caught are too great, yet that same fear leads some
firms to ponder how they can reap the benefits associated with anticom-
petitive cartels while avoiding any of the costs. One answer is to seek
protection from state governments: "they travel to their capital and, if
they are fortunate, are granted succor."' The idea that firms should be
shielded from competition under the umbrella of state protection and the
state action doctrine has no equivalent counterpart in other highly devel-
oped economic zones such as the European Union, and many within the
United States have criticized the doctrine for the substantial costs it
imposes on consumers. Unfortunately, courts have gone against the
grain and issued "varied and controversial interpretations [of the state
action doctrine], sometimes resulting in unwarranted expansion of the
exemption and the shielding of essentially private anticompetitive
conduct."'
This Article argues that not only is it appropriate to rein in expan-
sion of the state action doctrine, but also courts should go one step fur-
ther and remodel the doctrine to more closely resemble the European
Union's laws on Member State anticompetitive conduct. It is time to
prevent special interest groups from soliciting shelter from state legisla-
6. This Article will sometimes refer to the state action doctrine simply as the "doctrine."
Further, this Article focuses on how the doctrine can protect cartels from antitrust scrutiny, but it
should be noted that the doctrine protects all kinds of anticompetitive conduct (e.g., horizontal
market allocation and group boycotts). This Article focuses on cartels merely because they are
perhaps the most pernicious and well-known anticompetitive conduct.
7. Deborah Platt Majoras, State Intervention: A State of Displaced Competition, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2006).
8. Id. at 1179; see also Jim Rossi, Antitrust Process and Vertical Deference: Judicial Review
of State Regulatory Inaction, 93 IOWA L. REv. 185, 208 (2007) ("Without a judicial safeguard,
overbroad judicial endorsement of the state-action exception allows anticompetitive private
conduct to escape scrutiny altogether and risks undermining the goals of competition law . . . .");
Elizabeth Trujillo, State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides with Deregulation: Rehabilitating
the Foreseeability Doctrine, II FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 349, 353 (2006) ("[Blroad deference
to regulatory policy in addition to broad application of state action ... favor[s] already established
companies in the electricity market, essentially empowering the regulatory agencies and in turn,
advancing the interests of the dominant companies which they regulate.").
124 [Vol. 66:123
2011] PUTTING THE LID ON STATE-SANCTIONED CARTELS
tures, thereby deicing the freeze on pro-competitive market behavior
caused by the doctrine. Section I of this Article briefly describes United
States antitrust law and explores the historical underpinnings and devel-
opment of the state action doctrine. Section II assesses the dangers and
costs associated with the state action doctrine, exemplified by a typical
example of how private firms can engage in shielded cartelized behavior
under the guise of state regulation. Section III considers how the Euro-
pean Union treats anticompetitive state conduct to provide a framework
for overhauling the state action doctrine. Finally, Section IV explores
and responds to federalism concerns associated with any potential over-
haul of the doctrine.
I. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND THE STATE
ACTION DOCTRINE
The inception of United States antitrust law traces back to 1890
when Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 ("Sherman
Act").' Section One of the Sherman Act was designed to prevent cartels
and trusts from dominating the American landscape: it declared illegal
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States
.... "o For a period of over fifty years, the Sherman Act's reach was
vast; covering both public and private business combinations alike." Its
scope, however, was curtailed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Parker v. Brown,'2 which marked the inception of the state action
doctrine.
In Parker, the Supreme Court held that a California regulation was
not subject to the Sherman Act because federal antitrust legislation could
not preempt state law.' 3 The court wrote:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual
system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are
sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from
their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
9. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(2006)).
10. Id. § 1.
11. See Dirk C. Phillips, Note, Putting Parker v. Brown and its Progeny in Perspective: An
Assessment of the Supreme Court's Role in the Development of Antitrust Federalism, 16 J.L. &
POL. 193, 193 (2000).
12. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
13. The regulation at issue in the case was a raisin marketing program that allowed raisin
producers to petition for the establishment of a marketing plan that would effectively restrict
competition among the producers and maintain raisin prices. Id. at 346.
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over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress. 14
"The Parker approach treats a state legislative body as a 'sovereign,'
presumptively allowing it to regulate private conduct as it sees fit."' 5
The court in Parker, however, did not intend to allow a state to
countenance all anticompetitive behavior that would otherwise violate
the federal antitrust laws. The court recognized that "state regulation
could, in some instances, allow firms to engage in conduct that runs
afoul of the Sherman Act."l 6 Thus, the court recognized that "a state
does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by author-
izing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.""
California's regulation of private raisin producers did not contravene
this principle because the legislators had put into place an extensive reg-
ulatory apparatus, which included a public-approval process and an
enforcement mechanism:
It is the state which has created the machinery for establishing
the prorate program. Although the organization of a prorate zone is
proposed by producers, and a prorate program, approved by the Com-
mission, must also be approved by referendum of producers, it is the
state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and
which enforces it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a govern-
mental policy.'
Parker established a general presumption against preemption of state
regulation under the Sherman Act, but it left a number of questions
unanswered, including what types of state regulation would not be
immunized by the newly created doctrine. In other words, the Court left
open the question as to when private firms' conduct would be subject to
federal antitrust scrutiny despite being allegedly under the umbrella of
state regulation.
Subsequent cases applied the Parker state action doctrine, but
merely on a case-by-case basis, adding little in the way of a cohesive
framework. 19 The definitive answer would come later when the Supreme
Court began to question the highly deferential Parker approach to state
regulation. In 1980, thirty-seven years after Parker, the Supreme Court
articulated the modern approach towards state regulation of private
14. Id. at 350-51.
15. Rossi, supra note 8, at 193 (footnote omitted).
16. Id.
17. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
18. Id. at 352.
19. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (holding that fee schedules
enforced by a state bar association were not immune from antitrust attack); Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (holding no antitrust immunity where the state agency passively
accepted a public utility's tariff).
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interests in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc.20 In Midcal, the Supreme Court invalidated a California wine-pric-
ing scheme because California merely served as a conduit for private
wine producers to dictate prices charged by wine wholesalers. 2 ' The
Court established a two-prong standard for antitrust immunity under
Parker: 1) "the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy' "; and 2) "the policy must be
'actively supervised' by the State itself."22
The California wine-pricing scheme satisfied the first prong
because the California legislature had forthrightly stated the scheme's
purpose to permit resale price maintenance, but the scheme failed the
second prong.2 3 California played too passive of a role in the supervision
of wine prices: it "simply authorize[d] price setting and enforce[d] the
prices established by private parties." 24 The Court further chastised Cali-
fornia's role in the process: "The State neither establishe[d] prices nor
review[ed] the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor [did] it regu-
late the terms of fair trade contracts. The State [did] not monitor market
conditions or engage in any 'pointed reexamination' of the program."25
The Court emphasized that the "national policy in favor of competition
cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement
over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement."2 6
Although Midcal may seem like a high hurdle for antitrust defend-
ants to clear, it has become something of a paper tiger, in large part
because courts (including the Supreme Court itself) have chipped away
at its application. 27 The "gauzy cloak of state involvement" has not been
stripped of its effectiveness, and it continues to hide the dagger wielded
by private firms in the form of otherwise illegal price-fixing cartels and
other anticompetitive conduct. The dagger inflicts considerable wounds
on consumers' wallets, yet despite these effects, private firm cartels such
as the tobacco cartel described in the following Section still function,
thereby defying the "national policy in favor of competition."2 8
20. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
21. Id. at 101-102, 105.
22. Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978)).
23. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 105-06.
26. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
27. For example, in Hoover v. Ronwin, the Supreme Court limited Midcal to cases "involving
the anticompetitive conduct of a nonsovereign state representative." 466 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1984).
Thus, "[w]here the conduct at issue is in fact that of the state legislature," there is no need to
consider the issues of clear articulation or active supervision. Id. at 569.
28. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 101.
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II. A CARTEL WITHOUT CONSEQUENCES
"State action immunity drives a large hole in the framework of
the nation's competition laws. "29
The state action doctrine may seem to strike a fair balance between
state sovereignty and federal regulation, yet it has come at a steep price.
Consumers are invariably worse off economically as cartels use their
market power to artificially elevate prices beyond what would exist in a
normal competitive environment. By way of illustration, the infamous
vitamins cartel, which existed between four market leaders in the pro-
duction of vitamins A and E from 1989 until February 1999, raised
prices for those vitamins up to seventy percent and had drastic effects
both in the United States and Europe."o These drastic price increases and
the accompanying profits incentivize businesses to seek the protection of
the states through the state action doctrine, thus avoiding the severe pen-
alties they would incur if their behavior was uncovered by federal anti-
trust regulators. To demonstrate the dangers of cartels and the
relationship between such dangers and the state action doctrine, this Sec-
tion discusses the ongoing tobacco cartel that traces its origins to a
Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA") between big tobacco manufac-
turers and a majority of the states."
Although the vitamins cartel was ultimately discovered and its par-
ticipants punished, other cartels have prospered without fear of the con-
sequences, all by way of the state action doctrine. Owing its existence to
state action immunity, the tobacco cartel is one prominent example. It
has thrived as a result of the MSA signed by "46 states, five United
States territories, the District of Columbia, and the four major tobacco
and cigarette producers" (the Original Participating Manufacturers or
29. Joe Sims et al., The State of Federal Antitrust Enforcement - 2001: Report of the Task
Force on the Federal Antitrust Agencies - 2001, A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L., Jan. 2001, at 42,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrativelantitrust-1aw/report-antitrustenforce
ment.authcheckdam.pdf.
30. See Guy Sagi, The Oligopolistic Pricing Problem: A Suggested Price Freeze Remedy,
2008 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 269, 355-56 (2008). In a study performed by national enforcement
agencies, estimates of the cartel overcharges for 14 large multinational cartel cases between the
years 1996 and 2000 ranged from 5 to 65 percent, with the median around 15 to 20 percent. See
William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, What
is Competition? Address Before the Seminar on Convergence in The Hague, Netherlands 5 (Oct.
28, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200440.htm.
31. For additional examples of cartels or cartelized behavior protected by the state action
doctrine, see generally Clark C. Havighurst, Contesting Anticompetitive Actions Taken in the
Name of the State: State Action Immunity and Health Care Markets, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 587 (2006) (discussing cartelized behavior in the health care industry); Bobak Razavi,
Harmonizing Antitrust Exemption Law: A Hybrid Approach to State Action and Implied Repeal, 9
J. Bus. & SEc. L. 1 (2009) (discussing a Wisconsin case involving a local bar cartel).
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"OPMs").3 2 The MSA, through a variety of measures that were lobbied
for by the cigarette manufacturers, effectively froze competition in the
industry and barred new entry, thereby allowing the cigarette manufac-
turers to maintain market share while gouging consumers.3 3 As a result,
the MSA has come under fire from some critics who allege that it per-
mits the tobacco companies to act as a "state-sanctioned cartel, passing
on to consumers the costs of their estimated $206 billion damage pay-
ment and using the settlement structure to raise cigarette prices even
higher."3 4 Other critics have made even more damning accusations,
arguing that the "settling tobacco companies used smoking consumers'
money to purchase state permission to collusively increase cigarette
prices, while at the same time suppressing competition."3
The MSA has thus been described as a "law made in the course of
an end-run around state and federal legislatures," yet both the MSA and
the tobacco companies have evaded judicial castigation. In the most
recent challenge, Sanders v. Brown, Steve Sanders, the plaintiff, brought
suit against the four major tobacco companies and the California Attor-
ney General, alleging that the combination of the MSA, the post-settle-
ment price increases, and the mandatory state statutes implementing the
provisions of the MSA demonstrate a "cigarette price-fixing cartel that
violates the Sherman Act."" Sanders pointed to evidence that the OPMs
raised prices by $4.50 per carton immediately following enactment of
the MSA, and then proceeded to further raise prices by $7.70 in the next
three and a half years, all without any noticeable change in market
share.38 However, the district court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss, finding that the "Parker state-action immunity doctrine shielded
32. Robert W. Bauer, Note, Sanders v. Brown: State-Action Immunity and Judicial Protection
of the Master Settlement Agreement, 34 J. CORP. L. 1291, 1295 (2009). The MSA had two main
purposes: 1) the recovery of state funds used to treat tobacco-related illnesses through state
Medicaid or state employee health insurance plans; and 2) to enjoin the tobacco companies from
producing marketing campaigns that might appeal to underage tobacco users. Id.
33. Id. at 1295-99.
34. Daniel A. Crane, Harmful Output in the Antitrust Domain: Lessons from the Tobacco
Industry, 39 GA. L. REV. 321, 332 (2005); see Bauer, supra note 32, at 1291-92.
35. Bauer, supra note 32, at 1292. Indeed, there is evidence that the tobacco companies knew
that the MSA would facilitate the making of a tobacco cartel. Prior to signing the MSA, the OPMs
attempted to get blanket antitrust immunity from Congress, but Congress denied them immunity
because of the strong Federal Trade Commission opposition. Id. at 1301. Thus, "[t]he most
plausible explanation is that the tobacco producers' attempt to secure the antitrust exception
evinces a clear knowledge that achieving the goals of the MSA would facilitate, if not compel,
anticompetitive activity." Id. at 1301-02.
36. Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political
Legacy of the Government's Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1176 (2001); see also
Sanders v. Lockyer (Sanders 1), 365 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1104-05 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
37. Sanders v. Brown (Sanders II), 504 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2007).
38. Sanders 1, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
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the defendants from suit because the statutes administering the provi-
sions of the MSA were produced by sovereign acts that were not subject
to federal antitrust law." 39
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision and
agreed that the Parker doctrine shielded the defendants from liability for
entering into the MSA as well as any behavior that resulted from its
signing.40 The court considered whether to apply the more exacting Mid-
cal standard,4 1 but ultimately concluded that Midcal was inapplicable
because the enabling statutes implementing the MSA were the result of a
"sovereign acts."4 2 Instead, the court applied the Hoover standard, 4 3
which protected the MSA and its implementation because both were
considered sovereign acts of the state.
The Sanders decision has been characterized as plagued with
inconsistencies, with the court garnering criticism for shirking its
responsibility to apply the state action doctrine in its more rigid form.4
In particular, the Sanders court seemingly stretched the facts to avoid
applying the Midcal standard: the court held that this was not a case of
private parties acting in conjuction with state authorities to impose com-
petitive, yet the facts say differently." As one commentator put it, "it is
difficult to conceive of the MSA as anything but private parties impos-
ing competitive restraints in conjunction with state authorities."4 6 The
tobacco producers and the state attorneys general cooperated with each
other from the beginning, working side by side in secret meetings in
Washington and producing a settlement agreement that formed the basis
for the implementing statutes. 47 The Sanders court even admitted that
the attorneys general and tobacco producers together designed the incen-
tive system contained in the agreement to protect the OPMs' dominant
market share.48 Thus, the court's analysis suggests that it was straining
to find a way to avoid application of Midcal, likely because the MSA
and its implementing statutes would have failed the second prong under
39. Bauer, supra note 32, at 1298 (citing Sanders II, 504 F.3d at 910).
40. Sanders II, 504 F.3d at 916-19.
41. As opposed to the more relaxed standard of Hoover. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S.
558, 568-69 (1984).
42. Sanders II, 504 F.3d at 916.
43. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1984).
44. See generally Bauer, supra note 32, at 1299-1307 (discussing criticisms of the decision).
45. Sanders II, 504 F.3d at 916.
46. Bauer, supra note 32, at 1306. In fact, the MSA is "the first interstate compact that
constitutes both an agreement among the states and a legally binding agreement between the
states and a specific group of producers."' Id. (quoting Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and
Congressional Consent, 68 Mo. L. REv. 285, 347 (2003)).
47. Bauer, supra note 32, at 1306.
48. Sanders II, 504 F.3d at 906-08.
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Midcal.49
The Sanders decision demonstrates two primary faults with the
state action doctrine. First and foremost, the doctrine can facilitate the
creation of a private cartel that is immunized from federal antitrust laws,
thereby allowing such a cartel to raise prices without consequences. Sec-
ond, the doctrine is overly malleable, allowing courts to stretch it to its
outer limits to protect state regulation, even if such regulation is being
driven in part by private firms."o Although the Sanders case is somewhat
unique in that raised tobacco prices lead to decreased tobacco consump-
tion, a laudable social policy goal," it demonstrates perfectly the impli-
cations of allowing state regulations to trump the federal antitrust
laws-private firms seeking to form a cartel have an antitrust immunity
carrot dangled in front of their face that they would be foolish to pass
up.5 2 The solution is to overhaul the state action doctrine, incorporating
aspects of European Union law on state anticompetitive conduct while
also placing the burden on the states to justify anticompetitive economic
regulation.
III. THE TIME IS Now: A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF THE
STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are
the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms. "
The state action doctrine is antithetical to federal antitrust law
because it disrupts the healthy interaction between supply and demand,
49. The second circuit applied the Midcal standard to address the MSA and found that states
failed to "actively supervise" the OPMs pricing provisions: "The states ... lack oversight or
authority over the tobacco manufacturers' prices and production levels. These decisions are left
entirely to the private actors. Nothing in the [MSA] or its [Escrow] Statutes gives the states
authority to object if the tobacco companies raise their prices." Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer,
357 F.3d 205, 232 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
50. See Rossi, supra note 8, at 232 (discussing appellate courts' tendency to avoid strict
application of the Midcal standard).
51. Note, however, that social goals and antitrust enforcement policy are not meant to be
conflated: "Antitrust enforcement is bound by the rule of law. Enforcers or the courts cannot rank
antitrust's multiple social goals based on their ideology, by prosecuting only bad cartels (bid-
rigging on milk) versus good cartels (cigarette manufacturers, where a reduction in output may be
desirable)." Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 Sr. JOHN's L. REV. 951, 954
(2008).
52. Judicial decisions that adopt a strong deferential approach to state regulation "invite
private manipulation of state and local regulators to create antitrust immunity." Rossi, supra note
8, at 208.
53. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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instead allowing private firms to join together to set prices unresponsive
to the free market. This fact has not been lost upon the European Union,
which has enacted competition laws designed to prevent EU members
from protecting businesses or particular industries from the rigors of
competition. Although commentators in the United States have recog-
nized that the state action doctrine should be limited in scope because
state regulations "may have conflicting and not easily discerned motiva-
tions-some to control monopoly power or reduce adverse externalities,
others to promote cartels for politically favored producers-" 54 few, if
any, have proposed a wholesale makeover of the doctrine modeled after
the EU.
The EU, with a few particular exceptions, declares Member States'
measures to be subject to the same rules as private firms. The EU
declares illegal "all agreements between undertakings . . . which may
affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
internal market."" The EU outlaws cartels by prohibiting any agree-
ments between undertakings that "directly or indirectly fix purchase or
selling prices or any other trading conditions."" Contrary to the leeway
afforded to private firms by the state action doctrine in the United States,
the EU explicitly states that private firms granted favorable rights by
Member States are not to be accorded special treatment:
In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member
States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither
enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules con-
tained in the Treaties, in particular to those rules provided for in Arti-
cle 18 and Articles 101 to 109.57
The EU provides a very limited public service exception to this general
provision, which exempts undertakings "entrusted with the operation of
services of general economic interest" from the competition rules if and
only if application of the competition rules would hinder the perform-
ance of these undertakings, and the continued existence of the undertak-
ings in question does not burden trade among the Member States."
54. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism,
75 TEx. L. REV. 1203, 1250 (1997).
55. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101(1),
Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
56. TFEU art. 101(l)(a).
57. TFEU art. 106(1). Articles 101 to 109 contain the EU common rules on competition.
58. TFEU art. 106(2). An example of the public service exception is a monopoly granted by a
Member State for postal services, provided that the provision of the postal services is on
"acceptable economic conditions." See Mario Siragusa, Privatization and EC Competition Law,
19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 999, 1075-76 (1996) (discussing the identical provisions of a precursor to
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By interpreting the public service exception very narrowly and
requiring Member States to justify otherwise anticompetitive measures,
the EU has been strict in the application of its competition rules to pri-
vate entities granted monopoly or other special rights." Courts in the
EU have, however, treated special rights granted to private firms as jus-
tified if they are granted "for a non-economic, public interest reason"
such as for consumer or environmental protection.6 0 Yet these public
interest, non-economic establishments "remain subject to the prohibition
against discrimination and, to the extent that this performance comprises
activities of an economic nature, fall under the provisions referred to in
Article [106]."161
The EU's laws regarding public restraints and private firms granted
special protections provide a basic framework for overhauling the state
action doctrine in the United States. The new default rule for anticompe-
titive state conduct would mirror that of the EU: all state regulations or
protections afforded to private parties by state action would be subject to
the federal antitrust laws to the same extent as other private conduct.
Consistent with the original legislative intent of the Sherman Act,
state protections of public interest organizations would continue to enjoy
antitrust immunity, provided that such organizations are engaged in non-
economic activities. As Senator Sherman himself said, "[The Sherman
Act] does not interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary associations
made to affect public opinion . . .. They are not business combinations.
They do not deal with contracts, agreements, etc."62
Finally, for state regulations that concern economic activities,6 3
the TFEU). In its entirety, The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Article 106(2)
states:
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest
or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the
rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as
the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of
the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected
to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union.
TFEU art. 106(2).
59. See generally Siragusa, supra note 58, at 1074-78 (discussing application of the public
service defense in a variety of cases); Dana L. Romaniuk, Note, Regulating Public Monopolies in
Furtherance of the EEC Free Competition Goal: Article 90 and the Two-Step Approach, 69 CHI.-
KENr L. REV. 1025, 1034-40 (1994) (discussing the same in an identical precursor to the TFEU).
60. Romaniuk, supra note 59, at 1036. This is distinct from that of the public service
exception described previously, which justifies some anticompetitive economic measures.
61. Case 155/73, Sacchi v. Tele Bielle, 1974 E.C.R. 409, 428-29.
62. 21 CONG. REc. 2562 (1890) (remarks of Sen. John Sherman).
63. This category could be further limited in scope to state regulation of economic activities
that favors one or more particular private interests to ease the fears of those described in Part IV
infra. For state regulation of other economic activities (e.g., the number of hours a class of persons
may work), a less exacting standard could be employed, such as rational basis review, which
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states would retain the ability to grant special rights to private firms or
otherwise pass anticompetitive state regulation, but only on limited
grounds. The standard could be similar to the analysis currently
employed by courts in reviewing the infringement of an individual's
fundamental, constitutional rights. First, the state must justify the
anticompetitive conduct by demonstrating a compelling governmental
interest, which is understood as referring to something necessary or cru-
cial.6 4 Second, the anticompetitive conduct must be narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling governmental interest. 65 In other words, there
cannot be a less anticompetitive means to effectively achieve the com-
pelling government interest. 66 The burden would be on the states to
prove all of the above, and it would be difficult for a state to do so, in
the same way that it is difficult for an EU Member State to defend
anticompetitive measures.
Adopting this new version of the state action doctrine would likely
limit or even extinguish antitrust immunity for private cartel partici-
pants. Consider, for example, the implementation of the MSA and the
effective creation of the tobacco cartel described previously. Under the
new standard, the reviewing court68 would consider whether the states'
asserted interest in passing the MSA-to recover state funds and prevent
merely asks whether a governmental action is a reasonable means to an end that may be
legitimately pursued by the government. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938) (describing rational basis review). The main point is that the state action
doctrine in its current form protects private anticompetitive conduct far too often without
sufficient safeguards, and thus, there is a need for a strict standard to review state regulation that
protects private anticompetitive conduct. For a different variation, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 627, 632-33 (2006) ("[I]f a state . . .
government really authorizes and effectively supervises a private restraint, so be it. Federal
antitrust cannot intervene simply because federal tribunals believe that the regulation in question
is ill-advised, inefficient, or a manifestation of interest group capture. However, antitrust need not
countenance restraints in which the effective decision makers are the market participants
themselves.").
64. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 793, 800 (2006). An example of a potential
compelling governmental interest is consumer protection or traditional public interest
justifications, such as health and safety. See, e.g., Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144.
65. See Winkler, supra note 64, at 800.
66. Id.
67. For another view, see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1976)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (proposing a similar, albeit less stringent, test as the aforementioned
proposal). Blackmun advocates a rule of reason approach, in which a court would look to the
reasons behind the state regulation in question and then engage in an analysis to determine
whether a scheme's potential harms outweigh its benefits. Id.
68. This analysis presumes that the court found the tobacco cartel's behavior, in allegedly
fixing prices, to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act, which it most likely was. See Bauer,
supra note 32, at 1301 ("The anticompetitive conduct facilitated by the MSA was almost certainly
contemplated to be a per se violation of the federal antitrust laws.").
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marketing to underage consumers69 is compelling enough to justify the
implementation of the MSA and the tobacco cartel it formed and subse-
quently immunized. Assuming the states' interest is regarded as compel-
ling-a debatable propositiono-the court would surely take issue with
the particulars of the MSA scheme because, although the MSA required
the tobacco companies to pay the states billions of dollars each year," it
allowed the tobacco companies to form a cartel and pass the costs of the
settlement onto ultimate consumers.72
It is difficult to believe that the states could not have devised an
alternative scheme that would have preserved competition among the
big tobacco firms while still accomplishing the states' goals. For exam-
ple, the states could have settled for a lump sum payment that would
have taken into account projected health care costs associated with
smoking for a number of years, with additional stipulations restricting
the tobacco manufacturers from marketing towards underage children.
Thus, the tobacco cartel would not have been immunized from antitrust
scrutiny because the MSA, as implemented, would fail the second prong
of the reformed state action doctrine: the MSA was not narrowly tailored
to achieve the state governments' compelling interests.
State-sanctioned cartels and other state anticompetitive conduct are
serious issues and are recognized as such by the EU, which has taken
proactive steps to confront the problem. The United States should follow
in the EU's footsteps and impose a higher burden on the states to justify
their conduct. Further, concerns regarding the impact of an overhaul of
the state action doctrine on the balance of power between the states and
the federal government, although important to recognize, should not pre-
vent any such overhaul as demonstrated in the following Section.
IV. FEDERALISM CONCERNS
"[C]oncerns for federalism do not require the federal antitrust tri-
bunal simply to cave in to purely private business discretion."7
It is little wonder why the state action doctrine has survived this
69. See Bauer, supra note 32, at 1295.
70. There are a number of cases where a state has presented what, on its face, could be
considered a compelling interest, yet the Court has found otherwise. See, e.g., Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding state's police power cannot
substantiate prohibition against procreation of criminals); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(finding state's interest in ensuring the health of a pregnant woman prior to end of first trimester
not compelling enough to validate statute preventing all abortions save for those necessary to save
mother's life); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding state's interest in promoting
morality deemed insufficient to justify statute criminalizing sodomy).
71. See Bauer, supra note 32, at 1295.
72. See Section I infra.
73. Hovenkamp, supra note 63, at 648-49.
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long as it is grounded in the notion that the federal government should
give "[d]eference to considered state economic choices."" In other
words, antitrust law must give way to federalism concerns" for it is "the
foundation of our constitution" that any action by the central govern-
ment that invades state sovereignty should be "'an intrusion justified by
some necessity, and as the exception rather than the rule.'" 7 6 Supporters
of the state action doctrine insist that the doctrine is necessary to ensure
that "the states' constitutional powers to regulate commerce are not
entirely destroyed, as during the Lochner era." Defenders of the doc-
trine see judicial review of state laws "for efficiency, rent-seeking, or
public-interest goals as tantamount to federal courts returning to sub-
stantive-due-process review of state and local regulation, encroaching on
decentralized lawmaking in the economic-regulation context."" There
are even those who favor exempting all regulatory actions 9 by state
governments from judicial review under federal antitrust laws.so
The state action doctrine, however, falls well short of meeting its
federalism objectives. For one, if the doctrine is best described as a
means to enhance "political participation in the formulation of regula-
tory policies," then its utility is relatively small. As Professor Elhauge
explains, current political institutions are poorly designed to ensure citi-
zen participation in policymaking, and in general, citizens pay little
attention to individual policy decisions." Further, the fact that there has
not occurred a "groundswell of popular participation in regulatory pol-
74. William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction
and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1107
(1981).
75. The goals of federalism are multitudinous, ranging from ensuring citizens' political
participation in policymaking to protecting spheres of state sovereignty to enhancing or
maintaining economic efficiency. See generally Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 54, at 1209-50
(discussing the goals of federalism). Each of these will discussed herein.
76. See Phillips, supra note 11, at 196-97 (quoting HERBERT WECHSLER, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism, in PRINCIPLES, POLYTICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 49 (1961)).
77. Peter Hettich, Mere Refinement of the State Action Doctrine Will Not Work, 5 DEPAUL
Bus. & COMM. L.J. 105, 142 (2006). In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme
Court invalidated a New York law restricting the number of hours that a baker could work on both
a daily and weekly basis. The case has been heavily criticized for usurping state legislative
authority over economic activities that invoke public safety or welfare concerns. See, e.g., Edwin
Meese III, A Return to Constitutional Interpretation from Judicial Law-Making, 40 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 925, 927 (1996).
78. Rossi, supra note 8, at 209.
79. When referred to in this Article, the terms "regulatory actions" or "regulations" are meant
to encompass state legislation and any other types of policymaking functions as well.
80. See Rossi, supra note 8, at 210. Those holding this viewpoint do, however, acknowledge
that delegations of the power to restrain the market to private parties should remain subject to the
Sherman Act. Id.
81. See Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 668,
678-79 (1991).
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icy" belies the court's belief in Midcal that its approach to analyzing
anticompetitive state conduct would maximize political participation.82
If there is a federalism justification to preserving the state action doc-
trine in its current form, it lies not with increasing political participation.
The presence of spillover effects8 3 that reduce economic efficiency
at the national level present another rationale for why concerns for fed-
eralism should not obscure the need for an overhaul of the state action
doctrine. In general, states are self-interested, which means they develop
economic policies without taking into account (or perhaps willfully
ignoring) the policy's extraterritorial effects.84 For example, in Parker,
California's scheme to prop up its in-state raisin industry had an enor-
mous impact outside of the state: almost all raisins consumed in the
United States were produced in California and somewhere between
ninety and ninety-five percent of all raisins grown in California were
shipped in interstate or foreign commerce." This spillover effect has
been recognized by both government agencies and commentators alike"
as a significant issue; one that the state action doctrine in its current
form glosses over or even promotes. There is thus a growing belief that
concerns over federalism do not justify maintaining the doctrine's cur-
rent status quo;87 rather, the doctrine is in dire need of an overhaul
because of its impact on economic efficiency.
Finally, concerns over state sovereignty that might attach if a state
is confronted with the burden of justifying its anticompetitive conduct
merit a twofold response. First, the proposed reform does not entirely
strip the state and its constituent parts of their sovereign right to regulate
economic activities. Rather, it addresses the situation where a state's
anticompetitive economic regulation benefits a discrete class of private
interests (e.g., the MSA). These types of regulation carry a heightened
82. See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 54, at 1264.
83. Spillover effects, also known as "negative externalities," are the "costs absorbed by the
citizens of other states when any one state imposes an anticompetitive regulatory scheme." See
FED. TRADE COMM'N OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE
40 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf [hereinafter "TASK
FORCE REPORT"].
84. Id. at 41 ("[W]hen anticompetitive state regulations tend to produce in-state benefits but
out-of-state harms, states have incentives to over-regulate in ways that reduce welfare for the
nation as a whole.").
85. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 345 (1943).
86. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 40-44 (discussing both private commentators
and the FTC's views on interstate spillovers).
87. See Memorandum from Antitrust Modernization Comm'n to All Comm'rs 25 (June 5,
2006), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/pdf/meetings/IE-stateact-discmemo060605circ.pdf
("Federalism and state sovereignty do not justify the state action doctrine where the costs of the
anticompetitive conduct are borne primarily by citizens of other states . . . .").
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risk of regulatory capture" and warrant additional judicial scrutiny.8 9
Second, the trend in the Supreme Court (outside the context of anti-
trust law) has been to broaden federal economic regulatory powers at the
expense of the states.90 In its landmark 1985 decision Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,91 the Court held that "[s]tate
sovereign interests . .. are more properly protected by procedural safe-
guards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power."92 If Parker and the inception of
the state action doctrine are best understood as a byproduct of the pre-
vailing trend in constitutional law existing at the time-that of deference
to the states 9 -then it is entirely appropriate to reevaluate and retool the
doctrine in light of the modem trend towards broadening the reach of
federal economic powers.94
CONCLUSION
The state action doctrine is a blunt instrument used by states to
distort competition and by private interests to engage in illegal cartelized
88. See Rossi, supra note 8, at 198 ("[A]t the state and local level, extreme interest groups are
more likely to wield influence, while at the national level extremist groups are more likely to
cancel each other out."); see also John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust
Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REv. 713, 714-15 (1986) (criticizing the state action doctrine because
state regulation frequently involves "the capture of lawmaking bodies by producer groups seeking
benefit at the expense of others").
89. The FTC recognized a need for additional protections against regulations benefitting
insular private interests and suggested that when a state regulatory agency approves a particular
instance of rate bureaus or other forms of price fixing, it should issue a written opinion on the
merits explaining its decision and the factual findings supporting that decision. See TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 83, at 55. These "reasoned elaborations [would] serve to provide transparency
to the process and help ensure that agency decisions do not reflect simply private interest capture."
Hovenkamp, supra note 63, at 643.
90. Much of the expansion of federal economic power came under the rubric of the
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Examples of cases where the Supreme Court took
a broad view of interstate commerce include: Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971);
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). The Court did,
however, limit the definition of interstate commerce in two relatively recent cases-United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)-yet those
cases are unlikely to be the start of a trend limiting federal power in light of the Court's decision
in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
91. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
92. Id. at 552.
93. See Phillips, supra note 11, at 209-212 (describing political and constitutional climate
preceding and proceeding Parker).
94. One could also make the argument that the high degree of deference accorded to the states
by courts make little sense when foreign countries receive less deference under federal antitrust
laws. For example, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993),
the Supreme Court held that principles of comity did not prevent the Court from exercising
jurisdiction over foreign defendants, despite the fact that the alleged illegal conduct on the part of
the defendants was perfectly consistent with British law and policy.
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behavior without the threat of successful prosecution. As the tobacco
cartel created by the MSA and its subsequent state-by-state implementa-
tion demonstrates, consumers should be leery of anticompetitive state
regulation for "[i]t is [ ] the governments themselves which cause dam-
age to consumers and reduce overall economic welfare due to distortions
and restraints of competition resulting from their laws, regulations or
concrete administrative practice." Overcoming the harmful effects of
the state action doctrine requires an overhaul of the doctrine modeled
after the EU, which would establish the presumption that all state
anticompetitive conduct is within the reach of federal antitrust law. The
state would bear the burden of proving otherwise, either by demonstrat-
ing that the law in question regulates organizations engaged in non-eco-
nomic activities, or that any law that benefits private interests is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state governmental interest.
Requiring states to bear a higher burden in justifying their anticom-
petitive conduct certainly invokes federalism issues, yet a modernized
form of the state action doctrine would make great leaps in promoting
economic efficiency while leaving some room for the states to regulate.
The doctrine in its current form does little to promote citizen's political
participation in policymaking-an important federalism objective-and
reformation of the doctrine would comport with the Supreme Court's
current trend towards broadening federal economic powers. Federalism
concerns merit mention in any discussion of revamping the state action
doctrine, but they should not be determinative of the issue.
If left unchecked, cartelized behavior under the cloak of state
immunity will continue to multiply, a result which the state action doc-
trine in its current form is ill-suited to prevent. It is time to remold the
doctrine, thereby restoring the reputation of federal antitrust law as the
Magna Carta of free enterprise and preventing state regulation from
trumping federal antitrust law where inappropriate. It is time to make the
state action doctrine, as currently constituted, a thing of the past, so that
we may look to a future where consumers are not harmed by state-sanc-
tioned cartels or other anticompetitive state conduct.
95. Dr. Ulf Boge, President of the Bundeskartellamt, Speech before the Seoul Competition
Forum 2004: State-Imposed Restrictions of Competition and Competition Advocacy (April 20,
2004), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/04Seoul-e.PDF.
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